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The Effects of Discrimination in Public Goods Games 
Introduction 
This study explores the effects of 
discrimination on people’s willingness to 
contribute to public goods. The experiment 
not only attempts to measure the 
significance of this partiality, but also 
attempts to shed light on how discrimination 
affects this willingness to contribute by 
testing both the feeling of discrimination and 
the possibility that discrimination leads to 
lower payouts. Beyond this, the study acts 
as an opportunity to further connect the 
thoughts, behaviors, and political tendencies 
of social groups to their fiscal decisions. 
Melinda Maroto, Economics Department and Honors Program, University of Rhode Island 
Literature  Review 
• Focus of prior research:  
– Proving the “Free Rider” effect 
– Analyzing effects of demographic differences such 
as gender, ethnicity, and income level 
– Analyzing  effects of psychological differences such 
as altruism and decision error 
• Recent experimental design shifts  
– Accounting for heterogeneity of groups 
– Accounting for group connectedness/altruism 
– Reworking design to minimize decision error and 
miscomprehension 
• Further improvements for my study 
– Reworking design to minimize miscomprehension of 
instructions and game play 
– Careful consideration of treatment randomization for 
statistical significance 
• Participants: 120 University of Rhode Island students 
• Treatments 
– Control Group: knowledge of their contribution payout structure 
and no knowledge of any discriminatory conditions of the other 
players 
– Treatment Group 1: identified as a disadvantaged group but 
with no change in its payouts 
– Treatment Group 2: learns that they have been assigned to a 
disadvantaged population and are made aware of exactly how 
disproportionate their payout structure is as compared to the 
other members of their group 
• Game Parameters 
– Public good to fund: public school 
– Groups of 3 
– Rounds of contribution collection: 5 
– Tokens given per round: 25 
– Payout structure: (See Table 1) 
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Group Payout Structure 
Control Group (total group contributions*1.5)/3+ tokens kept 
Treatment 1 (total group contributions*1.5)/3+ tokens kept 
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Payout Optimums 
Social Optimum 
• Maximize group payout -> Everyone contributes all 
25 of their tokens each round  
• 25 tokens * 3 people/group = 75* 1.5 multiplier  
– 112.5 token payout/group 
– 37.5 token payout/person 
Private Optimum 
• Maximize individual payout -> Individual keeps all 
25 of their tokens each round while other group 
members contribute all of their 25 tokens 
• 0+25+25 tokens/group * = 50 * 1.5 multiplier 
– 100 token payout/group 
– Player 1: 50 tokens 
– Player 2: 25 tokens 
– Player 3: 25 tokens 
• Leads to “Free Rider” problem = No contributions 
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Average Contributions  
out of 25 tokens 
Average Contributions by Treatment  
 
• Difference in tokens from Control Group’s 
average: 
– Treatment 1: 0.961 (0.904) 
– Treatment 2a 2.916*** (0.952) 
– Treatment 2b 1.883** (0.964) 
• Treatment 2a has highest average contribution 
despite being most disadvantaged 
 
Average Contributions by Round 
 
• Contributions began modest and overall 
decreased as rounds progressed 
• Treatment 2a consistently contributed the 
most of all treatments by round also 
 
** p-value < 0.05, *** p-value < 0.01 
Standard errors in parentheses 
Interpretation of Results 
• Expectation met: contributions decreased over the 
course of the game 
• Expectation met: contributions were more consistent 
with the private optimum than the social optimum 
• Expectation challenged: most discriminated group 
produced the highest contributions per round and 
overall throughout the game 
Potential Reasoning 
• Perhaps disadvantaged participants sought to 
overcome their discrimination by over-compensating 
in contributions, i.e. income effect 
• Otherwise, could be an effect of altruism or 
confusion, though the latter is unlikely based on 
experimental design 
Room for Further Study 
• Explore variation of discrimination's psychological 
connotations -> economic interpretations for 
contributions to public goods rather than assign 
general sense of “disadvantage” to a test group 
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